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Abstract:  
In the recent decades, the subject of a shift of emission from regions with stringent regulation 
to developing countries has arisen. At the same time, regulated countries such as Sweden has 
experienced less industrial growth. In light of this, we will explore if the implementation of 
the European Union Emission Trading System in 2005 has led to investment leakage in the 
iron and steel sector from Sweden. As the steel and iron industry is highly emission-intensive 
and relatively open to trade, the Pollution Haven Effect claims that environmental regulations 
will lead to relocation from a regulated economy to an unregulated. We perform a difference-
in-differences strategy examining panel data on Swedish outward FDI flows between 1998 
and 2016. Although earlier research find no evidence for a Pollution Haven Effect, this 
analysis points to the opposite by concluding that the EU ETS has led to investment leakage. 
Due to internal validity threat combined with a limited time frame, our results are drawn with 
caution opening for future investigations. 
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3 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Conventional wisdom in energy-intensive industries is that stricter climate policy weakens the 
capability of performing in a competitive way because of large emission abatement costs and 
asymmetric climate policies around the world (Zechter et al., 2017). Although different climate 
policies are emerging globally, the first and largest regional carbon pricing system currently 
implemented is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). It is targeting energy 
intensive industries with the aim of decreasing greenhouse gases (GHG) caused by the biggest 
emitters among the EU28 plus Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland (i.e. EFTA). The key 
component to accomplish this is allocating a fixed number of tradable GHG allowances to the 
polluters, and leaving the firms to buy and sell these allowances between one another. 
 
 
Putting a price on carbon increases the threat of carbon leakage. Reinaud (2008) defines carbon 
leakage “as the ratio of emissions increase from a specific sector outside the country (as a result 
of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the emission reductions in the sector (again, 
as a result of the environmental policy)” (p.3). This leakage in emissions mainly takes place 
through two channels: operational and investment leakage. 
 
 
One concern of implementing environmental policy is that within a particular sector, the 
constrained region faces certain costs whereas others, non-constrained regions, do not. This 
creates a comparative disadvantage for the regulated economy to the benefit of non-constrained 
regions. The additional costs may lead to operational leakage in the short-term, which means a 
shift of market shares from the constrained region to foreign competitors that are not covered by 
the regulations (Reinaud, 2008). In the long-run, the threat of industries relocating to countries 
with laxer environmental regulations (investment leakage) is emerging. The overall consequence 
would be an augmentation in GHG emissions globally, which is at the same time affecting the 
international environment as well as the efficiency of climate policy. 
 
 
Particularly sensitive sectors to these emission abatement costs are the ones that are highly CO2-
intensive and internationally open to trade, such as the iron and steel sector. The Alliance of 
Energy Intensive Industries amongst others debates that the implementation of the 
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EU ETS is a contributing factor to European industries loss in competitiveness (European 
Commission, n.d.a). 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study investment leakage for the Swedish iron and steel industry. 
The reason behind this is that this sector stands alone for 36 percent of total emissions in 
Sweden, making it the largest emitting industry and undeniably a target for the EU ETS. Since 
Sweden in the recent decades has experienced a diminishing industrial growth and at the same 
time has increased outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, the worry of these flows 
causing emissions in developing countries has arisen (SCB, n.d.; SCB, 2017). The total amount 
of emissions on a Swedish national level has also decreased after 1990 (Naturvårdsverket, 2017), 
which could advocate in favour for that emissions have moved outside the country. 
 
 
Due to trade openness together with uneven climate policies, regulated nations may migrate their 
production of energy-intensive goods to countries with more favorable climate policies. This is 
known as the Pollution Haven Effect (Copeland & Taylor, 2004). To our knowledge, only a few 
rigorous ex post studies has been made tackling investment leakage as a result of the EU ETS 
(Koch & Houdou, 2016). Therefore this paper, as is the first of its kind using Swedish data, will 
be exploring if the concern of relocation is valid with regards to the EU ETS. To further analyse 
this issue, we will use FDI data provided by Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB) on outward FDI 
flows of Swedish firms. 
 
 
1.2 Purpose  
This paper studies the potential consequences of the EU ETS in the iron and steel sector. More 
precisely, we observe outbound FDI flows from Sweden possibly resulting from the regulation 
(i.e. the long-run perspective, investment leakage). We focus on horizontal FDI, when a firm 
invests in the same sector as the one they operate in their so-called home country (Feenstra & 
Taylor, 2017, p. 23). 
 
 
The reason to disregard operational leakage, the short-run perspective, is that Swedish steel 
industry is highly niched and therefore in general not threatened to the same degree by 
operational leakage as other countries producing conventional steel (Atallah, 2018, March 1st). 
With this in mind, and the largest emission trading scheme being persistent and Sweden 
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being a target of it, we aim to examine whether the implementation of the EU ETS may have 
induced investment leakage or not. 
 
 
This potential outcome has its foundations in the Pollution Haven Effect as mentioned above. To 
examine this belief, we apply a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy. Through a DID, we will 
be able to compare the outcomes before and after the implementation of the EU ETS for a sector 
affected by the policy change (in this case, the iron and steel sector) to an unaffected. Our 
theoretical prediction is that outward FDI flows have increased in countries with less stringent 
regulation since the implementation of the EU ETS. We have for that reason divided our 
statistics into different regions and will then compare our findings for each region. 
 
 
1.3 Disposition  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a deeper background about the EU ETS. 
Section 3 illustrates an overview of earlier research. After this, the relevant theoretical 
frameworks are discussed in section 4. Then section 5 will describing the data and the limitations 
concerning this. From there, in section 6, the econometric model will be both presented and 
debated. Subsequently, our formed DID-model is tested in section 7 and results are portrayed. 
Section 8 elaborates on our findings together with illustrating the current circumstances in the 
iron and steel sector as well as what future research should focus on. Succeeding this, section 9 
concludes this paper with emphasize on our discoveries. At last follows the references and 
appendix. 
 
 
2. The EU ETS 
 
The EU ETS was launched in 2005 as a policy instrument aiming to reduce GHG emissions by at 
least 40 percent in 2030 in comparison to historical output in 1990 (European Commission, 
n.d.b). Operating in 31 countries in total, the mandatory emission trading scheme targets 
approximately 11,000 energy-intensive installations as it covers about 45 percent of total GHG 
emissions in the EU. The policy is based on the cap and trade principle where a cap is set 
including a total amount of GHG emissions allowed (permits) by the companies covered by the 
scheme. It is then up to the companies within the cap to trade permits between one another (if 
they wish to do so), which makes this a market based instrument. The cap is then reduced each 
year by a certain amount to continuously decrease 
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the environmental impact. Each permit gives the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide, and the 
total amount of permits is reduced throughout the years. 
 
 
The system is divided into four phases. The first phase started with the implementation as a 
“learning by doing” process between 2005 to 2007, where a generous cap of free allowances 
was set based on estimated needs for targeted installations. The following trading period, phase 
II, spanned the period from 2008 to 2012 corresponding with the Kyoto Protocol commitment. 
Although a reduction of emission allowances by 6.5 percent was set in phase II, the economic 
downturn in 2009 led to a surplus of allowances and the cap on permits remained large. Phase III 
is the current phase covering the period from 2013 to 2020. Since 2013, the cap is reduced every 
year, entailing a 21 percent reduction of GHG emissions compared to output in 2005. To achieve 
the final goal of a 40 percent reduction by 2030, the phase IV (2021 to 2030) needs to be further 
revised. With respect to emissions in 2005, the installations covered by the system need to 
reduce their GHG emissions by a total of 43 percent by the end of phase IV. This will be 
undertaken by yearly reducing the cap by 2.2 percent from 2021 onwards. 
 
 
By being the first to put a price on carbon, the EU ETS is facing a challenge of lower emissions 
in regulated areas while the opposite in the so called third countries (i.e. carbon leakage). In 
order to address this concern, the EC has developed the free allocation of permits. This has since 
the implementation been the dominant principle of allocation, since it is advocated to help 
preventing the risk of carbon leakage. The alternative way of allocation is auctioning of permits, 
which is progressively taking place in the majority of the sectors covered by the scheme. As free 
allocation is the main argument to prevent carbon leakage, the EC has acted very precautionary 
in carbon-intensive industries concerning auctioning. However, since the share of auctioning is 
expected to rise significantly in manufacturing industry in the future, associations such as Energy 
Intensive Industries (n.d.) has been lobbying against the opening up of auctions. 
 
 
3. Literature Review  
The existing evidence about the amount of spillover effects that can be expected due to 
environmental regulations is not conclusive. Common knowledge advocates that environmental 
regulations weaken the capability of firms to act in a competitive way, whereas 
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many empirical studies do not find support for this. This section will discuss earlier research 
assessing carbon leakage together with different aspects and consequences of relocation. 
 
 
3.1 Carbon Leakage Literature  
Branger et al. (2016) study the carbon leakage effect from the EU ETS, and show that it is non-
existent. The authors tested this belief for the cement and steel industry, as these sectors are 
energy-intensive and likely to be vulnerable for climate policy. Even though these sectors are 
vulnerable, no evidence for operational leakage could be proven. By using European emission 
allowances (EUA) prices as their main regression variable, Branger et al. conclude that prices on 
EUA has little to no impact on the competitiveness of a firm. However, the authors could not 
conclude that free allocation of allowances should be scrapped, as they disregard the production 
capacity perspective (i.e. leakage through the investment channel). They referred to the question 
of investment leakage as an open question, as this particular research area is relatively 
undiscovered. 
 
 
Koch and Houdou (2016) focus on the issue of production capacity, by studying FDI data on 
German manufacturing firms. This was applied on a DID analysis with one country being an EU 
ETS member while the other country is not. The authors conclude that only a small share of the 
studied firms experienced industrial relocation to a non-EU ETS member since the 
implementation of the scheme. However, their results cannot be solely attributed to the EU ETS 
implementation, as the concerned firms did not operate in an emission intensive nor an energy-
intensive industry. They further claim that the reason to this could be that many EU ETS firms 
that are emission-intensive often also are capital-intensive with high fixed plant costs, which 
creates relatively high relocation costs. 
 
 
In contrast to studies mentioned above, Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) assessed carbon leakage 
as a result of the Kyoto protocol and found empirical evidence for this. By using a DID 
approach, they investigated the impact of the Kyoto protocol comparing CO2 emissions with 
CO2 net imports and carbon footprint in countries committed to the agreement. The authors 
conclude that the Kyoto protocol has led to domestic emission savings by about 7 percent but 
without changing the carbon footprint. This ex post study showed a 14 percent increase in net 
import of carbon dioxide, and thereby indicating (although not explicitly formulated) a carbon 
leakage estimation of about 100% since the implementation of the protocol. In similarity with the 
EU ETS, the Kyoto protocol exempts emerging and 
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developing countries, which raises the question of the pollution haven effect as a consequence of 
the EU ETS. 
 
 
Wu (2013) concludes that that Pollution Haven Effect is a valid concern for the European Union 
as the stringency of the EU ETS is believed to be the cause behind emissions shift to regions 
with laxer regulation. To study this connection, Wu employs a difference-in-differences strategy 
by analyzing panel bilateral trade flows data. This data is then divided into two groups, the trade 
flows outside and inside the European Union. Her findings for the steel and iron industry, in 
contrast to her identified Pollution Haven Effect, demonstrates that the EU ETS has led to higher 
export flows while the opposite holds for imports. Lastly, Wu opens up for future research to 
investigate this relocation matter by looking at regarding domestic production and foreign direct 
investment. 
 
 
3.2 Relocation Concerns  
Martin et al. (2014) study the vulnerability to carbon pricing in firms regulated by the EU ETS. 
They identify two main relocation concerns from climate policy: relocation creates costs in terms 
of job losses to unregulated countries and weakens the effectiveness of the policy (since GHG is 
a global public bad). The authors provide a qualitative study interviewing 761 manufacturing 
firms in 6 European countries to examine firms’ propensity to downsize or relocate in response 
to climate change policy. They conclude that an average firm would neither relocate outside the 
ETS-borders nor fully shut down the company as a result of the EU ETS. There exists however a 
substantial variation in the reported vulnerability between sectors, and the iron and steel industry 
is according to the study among the most vulnerable ones. 
 
 
Oikonomou et al. (2006) also claim that environmental regulations are unlikely to have a 
substantial impact on relocation. They point out that when considering relocation, pollution 
abatement costs are generally lower than other costs such as tariffs, exchange rate volatility, 
transport costs and availability of qualified labour. Thus, pollution abatement costs are declared 
to be unlikely to impact relocation. However, Ederington et al. (2005) argue that there in fact are 
industries where those costs are relatively notable. In those cases, the concerned industries turned 
out to be very capital intensive and this diminished their incentives to relocate. Yet again, other 
costs exceeded the actual pollution abatement costs 
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and hence the study by Ederlington et al. (2005) corresponds to the conclusions reached by 
Oikonomou et al. (2006). 
 
 
Concerning the warnings about the relocation of industries outside the EU, Koch and Houdou 
(2016) convey that they are rather used as motives by firms to lobby for higher levels of permits 
than an actual threat. BusinessEurope (2016) sympathizes with this idea as they describe it as an 
overstatement, by pointing out that location is the last determining factor in carrying out an 
investment decision. They thereby express that the concern about more stringent environmental 
regulation is not likely to be the deciding factor for relocation in such a scheme as the EU ETS. 
However, relocation is still a highly debated subject in the research surrounding leakage for 
environmental policies as the diverse results founded by Koch and Houdou (2016), Branger et al. 
(2016) and Wu (2013) shows. This diverge conclusions from studies motivates why this belief 
should be explored in greater detail which we examine in connection to investment leakage. 
 
 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1 The Pollution Haven Effect  
The Pollution Haven Hypothesis emerged with the purpose of highlighting the potential 
environmental impacts caused by the liberalization of international trade (Brunnermeier and 
Levinson, 2004). The hypothesis states that a reduction of trade barriers will result in emission-
intensive industries shifting their production from the regulated part to the unregulated part of the 
world. Regions that experience these changes in FDI inflows are known as pollution havens. An 
example of this could be that more stringent regulation inside the EU cause higher FDI outflows 
to developing regions such as Asia. 
 
 
The Pollution Haven Hypothesis has its theoretical foundations in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
(Hille, 2015). In this context, the comparative disadvantage for carbon-constrained industries is 
the additional pollution abatement costs they face in relation to their foreign competitors. This 
could either result in losses of market share (operational leakage) or, at longer term, lead to 
relocation to pollution havens. However, the actual magnitude of pollution abatement costs is, as 
mentioned in the previous section, widely discussed. 
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According to Copeland and Taylor (2004), a distinction between the Pollution Haven Hypothesis 
and the Pollution Haven Effect should be made. They refer to the ‘Hypothesis’ as the effects of 
trade openness, whereas the ‘Effect’ refers to the consequences of a stringency in pollution 
regulation. In this context, the latter would be the central concept of this paper. 
 
 
Although the Pollution Haven Hypothesis often appear as an argument against environmental 
regulations, the existence and strength of it have yet been difficult to prove empirically. A 
common argument of its existence is the absence of ambitious climate policies in regions other 
than the EU, and that the only solution for effective climate policy would be a globally 
coordinated climate agreement (European Commission, n.d.a). Until such a binding international 
agreement has taken place, the concern of pollution havens should still be considered as 
environmental regulations are emerging. 
 
 
The theoretical prediction for pollution haven is that we will find positive amounts in billion 
SEK for North America and Rest of the World (ROW). We would expect the opposite to hold for 
EU28+EFTA as the outward FDI flows to this region is expected to decrease due to the EU ETS. 
This would then be in line with the ‘Effect’, which advocates higher FDI flows to North America 
as well as ROW while the contrary would hold for EU28+EFTA. 
 
 
4.2 Porter Hypothesis  
Historically, the view of stricter environmental regulation has been rather negative. The 
traditional outlook is that decreasing an externality such as air pollution, which a strict 
environmental regulation does, limits the regulated firms’ options and thereby reduce their profit 
(Ambec et al., 2011). Porter (1991) contributed to this with a new angle by stating that “Strict 
environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against rivals; indeed, 
they often enhance it” (p. 168). This is commonly referred to as the Porter hypothesis (PH) 
(Brännlund, 2007), which says that environmental regulation will lead to firms investing in 
research and development (R&D). Firms then either increase their productivity which in turn 
leads to lower costs or commit to product development that gives of a higher product value. Both 
of these options according to Porter results in improvement in competitive advantage. By 
declaring this idea, Porter also brings new light to the earlier less adverse perspective of negative 
externalities and gives insights on the positive effects a stricter regulation may result in. 
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Together with his co-author van der Linde, Porter claims that stricter regulation also results in 
more innovation (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). These new clean innovations may decrease the 
carbon footprint, thus improving the environment. This would imply that the innovation effects, 
that would be created by this connection between innovation and regulation, would lead to the 
regulated parties experiencing less additional costs (Ambec et al., 2011). The reason behind this 
is that regulation generates pressure, which in turn lays the foundations for motivations to 
innovation and progress. Although the theory of Porters and van der Linde has been thoroughly 
discussed, it is today viewed as a theory to explain the connections behind stricter regulation and 
more innovation. This provides support for more stringent environmental regulation, which is 
very needed with the rising trend of environmental policies emerging (Ambec et al. 2011). 
Research such as Martin and al. (2016) suggest the aspect of clean technology should be further 
explored by looking into if clean innovation creates repercussions for macroeconomic growth by 
crowding out of dirty innovations. According to our research, we are yet to find a strong link 
between EU ETS and the Porter Hypothesis and thereby these ideas will be further debated in the 
context of this paper. 
 
 
With regards to the Porter Hypothesis, the previous prediction about investment leakage might 
not hold. If Swedish firms find a way to become more productive by investing in innovation as a 
result of the policy, then they might not relocate and would hence diminish FDI outflows. 
 
 
5. Data  
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of EU ETS on investment leakage, by using 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a measure of leakages. A FDI is taking place when an 
investment is made cross-border by an investor in one country with purpose to establish a 
durable interest in another country. The ‘durable interest’ is attained when the investor owns at 
least 10 percent of the enterprise invested in (OECD, 2008). As earlier mentioned, outward FDI 
flows (referring to energy-intensive investments) could amount to negative environmental 
impacts in other countries which is the objective to examine in this paper. 
 
 
5.1 FDI-data  
To put this in an econometric perspective, we use foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows 
(assets per sector) as the dependent variable in our regression. We rely on yearly measured data 
from Statistiska Centralbyråns (SCB) statistical database, measured in billion SEK, that 
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spans the period from 1998 to 2016. As the EU ETS was implemented in 2005, the ex ante 
period is from 1998 to 2004 and ex post is 2005 to 2016. 
 
 
The data is divided into three different country groups: EU28+EFTA, North America and the rest 
of the world (ROW). This leads to three different DID analyses. Considering there are already a 
few ETS implemented in the world (although not in the same magnitude as the EU ETS), five 
countries are excluded from ROW (Switzerland, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand) (Carbon Market Data, n.d.). Even though there are cap-and-trade schemes implemented 
in both the United States (US) and Canada, we consider that testing for North America is still of 
high relevance. This is partly because the steel export market to the US is very vital for Sweden, 
and partly because the magnitude of the cap-and-trade systems compared to the EU ETS is 
relatively small (Atallah, 2018, March 1st; European Commission, n.d.a). The one closest to the 
size of the EU ETS, California’s cap-and-trade program, was first launched eight years after the 
EU ETS and is mainly targeting the transportation sector (ICAP, 2018). 
 
 
Based on our raw data, we observe 10 potential comparison groups (i.e. control groups) to the 
iron and steel sector. A more thorough explanation of what a control group is and a motivation of 
which ones that are chosen to be in the analysis will be explained in section 6. As for now, we 
list the different groups that becomes the foundation of our analysis. * 
 
 
● Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (G)** 
 
● Accommodation and food service activities (I) 
 
● Information and communication (J) 
 
● Financial and insurance activities (K) 
 
● Real estate activities (L) 
 
● Professional, scientific and technical activities (M) 
 
● Administrative and support service activities (N) 
 
● Public administration and defense; Activities of households as employers; Activities of 
extraterritorial organizations and bodies (O_T_U) 
 
● Education (P85) 
 
● Human health and social work activities (Q) 
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What separates these sectors from the iron and steel industry is that they are not emission nor 
energy intensive and unregulated by the EU ETS, which makes them valid comparison groups 
for the analysis. As the FDI data is measured in billion SEK, the analysis will be run in levels. 
 
 
*For full data material, see Appendix. ** The letter in the parenthesis is the one corresponding 
to a specific sector according to the Swedish classification system SNI (SCB, 2007) 
 
 
5.2 Limitations  
To conduct a richer analysis, it would be preferable that our data were disaggregated into finer 
regions. The threat of possessing aggregated data is that it might lead to overestimation of the 
Pollution Haven Effect. This because if in the ROW there are countries which are not pollution 
havens, the expected result would be no effect. Unfortunately, a more country-specific data 
requested from SCB led to a large number of data points being unavailable because of secrecy. 
Choosing the more country-specific data would lead to ignoring numbers in countries that are 
large steel producers, such as China, India, Turkey and Russia and would thereby weaken the 
reliability. With a more aggregated data, which we will run our analysis on, we were able to 
include these important countries in ROW. Nevertheless, data on Swedish FDI outflow to North 
America was unavailable in 2014 which we solved through interpolation. 
 
 
Another important aspect is that the assets abroad are presented in the Swedish companies sector 
affiliations, as the sector of the foreign asset is not specified. This means that if for example a 
Swedish steel company owns foreign companies within other sectors, these assets will be shown 
as steel industry. The assumption is further supported by the presence of horizontal FDI flows for 
the steel sector, in form of the Swedish SSAB investment in the American steel firm IPSCO after 
the implementation of EU ETS (Sunnesson, 2008, May 20th; SSAB, 2007, May 3rd). However, 
an overall trend of horizontal FDI flows into the same sector can not be assumed. In light of this, 
if there are spillovers in other sectors, that is something we will be forced to ignore in this 
analysis. 
 
 
6. Econometric Approach  
Two common methods for quasi-experimentally testing the impact of a policy changes are 
simple before-after difference and difference-in-differences strategy (Mitrut, 2018a). The 
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before-after strategy is generally practiced by comparing the relevant outcome variables before 
and after the policy is implemented, to discover any possible connections that can be derived as a 
result of the policy itself (Mitrut, 2018b). However, a drawback of this strategy is that it 
disregards of other factors that are trending between the studied years that may account for the 
change in the outcome of interest. 
 
 
For the purpose of this paper, this neglect is truly problematic as the influence of other 
macroeconomic factors that change over time most likely will be high. In order to overcome this 
issue, we adopt a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy since the method allows to control for 
different factors apart from the policy change that might otherwise lead to biased estimates 
(Mitrut, 2018a). 
 
 
6.1 Difference-in-differences  
Figure 1 shows annual Swedish outward FDI flows to North America in ‘Manufacture of iron 
and steel products’ (blue line) and ‘Professional, scientific and technical activities’ (orange line). 
In the second graph (Figure 2), Swedish FDI outflows to ROW are plotted. The blue line as well 
as the orange line portrays the same sectors for ROW as for North America, but for this region 
‘Real estate activites’ (grey line) is added. Lastly, Figure 3 illustrates the outward FDI flows 
from Sweden to the EU28+EFTA. This graph includes ‘Manufacturing of iron and steel 
products’ (blue line), ‘Professional, scientific and technical activities’ (orange line).‘Information 
and communication’ (grey line). The data is denoted in billion SEK during the years 1998 to 
2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Swedish FDI outflows to North America for the chosen sectors 
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Figure 2. Swedish FDI outflows to ROW for the chosen groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Swedish FDI outflows to EU28+EFTA for the chosen groups 
 
 
Through a DID, a treated (i.e. affected by the EU ETS) and a control group (i.e. unaffected by 
the EU ETS) is compared with each other before and after the policy. The key identification 
assumption to run the analysis is that in the absence of EU ETS, Swedish FDI in both sectors are 
assumed to follow the same trend. A necessary condition for this is that they are in parallel trends 
before the implementation. Another determining factor is that the control group should not be 
influenced by the policy change, which in this case means that it should not be regulated by the 
EU ETS. It is also assumed, that there is no policy other than the EU ETS in the post period 
(2005 onwards) that somehow affects the treatment and control group differently. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, both treatment and control group follow a similar trend for FDI outflows 
to North America. The same holds for the three groups in ROW (Figure 2). This 
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makes the chosen groups valid alternatives as control groups for a DID analysis. In contrast to 
this, the EU28+EFTA (Figure 3) is lacking similar trends before the EU ETS was enforced in 
2005 and thus the causal interpretation for this region diminishes. However, we consider it useful 
include this region in the analysis as it provides enriching information for the discussion and 
future research. 
 
 
The reason why the control groups differ between the regions is because different sectors were in 
parallel trends with the iron and steel sector in each region group. In North America, there was 
only one group comparable to the iron and steel sector in the pre-period based on key assumption 
and hence this region provides only one control group. In total, there are three control groups 
chosen from the 10 potential comparison groups earlier listed. To illustrate that these sectors are 
not regulated by the EU ETS, a more detailed explanation of each control group is described 
below. 
 
 
● ‘Professional, scientific and technical activities’ (M) (SCB, 2007). 
 This consist of legal affairs in form of activities in lawyer firms, legal agencies and 
 agencies focusing on patent issues. Besides that, this control group partly includes 
 affairs concerning accounting and tax advice as well other economic consulting affairs 
 is. Additionally, it contains of consultancy services and what is labelled as architecture  
 and technical consultancy. The statistics for FDI flows for the scientific research and 
 development together with advertising and market surveys is also derived from this 
 group.       
● ‘Real   estate  activities’(L) 
 Incorporates trade with owned real estate, rent as well as management of owned and 
 leased  these  types  of  properties.  Except  these,  are  also  real  estate  agencies  and 
 management of real estate by assignment part of this category.    
● ‘Information  and communication’  (J) 
 Contains publisher affairs such as the publications of books and newspapers. Another 
 part of this is releases of films, video- and TV-programs that concerns the whole 
 production   process.   Furthermore,   it   involves   telecommunications, computer 
 programming  together  with  data  consultancy  and  information  services  as  news 
 services and data processing.      
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For each region group, we run the following difference-in-differences regression for 1998 to 
2016: 
FDIi,t = β0 + β1Steeli + β2Postt +β3Steeli∗Postt+ δt + Ui,t 
 
 
FDIi,t = monetary amount in outward FDI in year t in sector i (outcome variable) 
 
Steel = 1 if the industry is steel, and 0 if not (treatment variable) 
 
Post = 1 in the period in which the EU ETS is in place (from 2005 onwards) 
 
δt = year fixed effects (capture year-specific shocks affecting FDI flows in both sectors) 
 
Ui,t = the error term, which captures unobservable determinants of FDI flows in a year t in 
industry i. 
 
 
Our main interest in this regression is the interaction term, i.e. the causal effect of interest 
(Dzemski, 2018). It estimates the difference between the average change, in billion SEK, in FDI 
in the control group and the average change in the treatment group from 1998 to 2016. This 
results in an interpretation whether the EU ETS had an impact on Swedish FDI outflows or not. 
 
 
6.2 Internal and External Validity 
 
As in any quasi-experimental study, validity is divided into two separate segments: internal and 
external validity (Meyer, 1995). Both of these will be discussed and reviewed with regards to the 
paper’s purpose of analyzing investment leakage for Swedish FDI flows. 
 
 
To analyze our panel data, we have opted to apply fixed effects (FE) (Gujarati and Porter, 2009, 
p. 599-602). This is an advantage for the analysis that leads to less biased estimates, as it covers 
for yearly global shocks that may affect both groups simultaneously. 
 
 
In this case, the main threat to internal validity concerns factors in the ex post period that may 
affect the two groups differently. For example, the financial crisis in 2008 affected the real estate 
pricing which may have affected the FDI in ‘Real estate activities’ to ROW. However, Figure 2 
does not show any larger downward fluctuation around this year. Another example of internal 
validity threat could be changes in relative prices in the steel sector compared to the control 
group, or lower raw material prices within the steel sector outside the EU that 
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attracts investments in this particular sector. These concerns are not taken into consideration in 
this analysis, as our model would conclude all increase in FDI flows as a result of the EU ETS. If 
there are other factors determining the choice of relocation in this period (which most likely is 
the case), our estimates could be biased. We acknowledge these limitations, and thus interpret 
our results with caution. 
 
From a validity standpoint, it is important to also cover the external validity. Meyer (1995) 
discuss how the effect of the treatment may fluctuate over time periods. For our model, this can 
be problematic as we are looking at three different phases and time periods for the EU ETS. We 
are aware of the looser cap in the beginning of the scheme (phase I) as well as the excessive cap 
in connection with the financial crisis (phase II). 
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 7. Results for Difference-in-Differences for each Region  
Table 1. An overview of every performed regression for each 
region 
 North America   Rest of World    
          
 Prof., Sc. & Tech. Real est. Prof., Sc. & Tech. Info. & Com. 
          
Type of 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
(1) 
reg. 
  
         
Steel x 20.489*** 20.489***  27.924* 27.924** 20.854 20.854*  -93.717*** 
Post (5.733) (5.003)  (14.821) (7.615) (13.716) (10.573)  (15.182) 
          
Steel 
7.786*** 7.786***  43.543*** 43.543*** 40.571*** 40.571***  -8.400 
(0.955) (0.718) 
 
(3.756) (3.477) (3.977) (3.021) 
 
(9.783)    
          
Post 8.120*** 
- 
 42.191*** 
- 
49.261*** 
- 
 122.032*** 
 
(1.060) 
 
(7.682) (5.240) 
 
(13.935)       
          
Obs. 38 38  38 38 38 38  38 
          
R
2 
0.6585 0.8693  0.7062 0.9651 0.7235 0.9177  0.8395 
        
Year FE  x  x  x  
           
Notes: These regressions were performed by using panel data from 
year 1998 to 2016. The table present the regressions for each region. 
Every variable, except R
2
, is round off to three decimals. The 
specification in regression (2) includes year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors is found inside the parentheses. Post is omitted for 
regression (2) because of collinearity and thereby these coefficients 
are not included in the table. Significance level are noted as follow 
1(***), 5(**) and 10(*). 
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 7.1 Results for North America  
For North America, our coefficient of interest in regression (1) is taking a value of 20.489 and is 
significant at the 1 percent level. This means that after 2005, average annual FDI in the iron and 
steel sector was 20.489 billion SEK higher than “Professional, scientific and technical activities”. 
The Steel coefficient shows that before the regulation, Swedish annual FDI outflow was higher 
in the iron and steel sector than in the control group. By analyzing the post coefficient, we 
observe that both sectors have experienced increasing FDI flows from Sweden in the post period. 
 
 
Regression in column (2) includes year fixed effects to control for year specific shocks affecting 
both industries. In regression (2), we find that the coefficient of interest is the same as regression 
(1) at 20.489, thereby the same interpretation applies here. The Steel coefficient is unchanged, 
only more precisely estimated just as the coefficient of interest. These findings support that our 
conclusions for regression (1) is correct. The R
2
 in regression (2) has also increased from 0.6585 
to 0.8693 when controlling for fixed effects, which indicates that a big part of the explanation is 
due to yearly variations. Therefore, we can conclude that investment leakage is present for North 
America due to the EU ETS, as Steel x Post is positive and significant in both regressions. 
 
 
7.2 Results for Rest of the World  
By performing regressions for ROW two control groups are applied: ‘Real estate activities’ and 
‘Professional, scientific and technical activities’. 
 
 
7.2.1 Real estate activities  
In regression (1), the coefficient of Steel x Post is 27.924 and is significant at the 10 percent 
level. This stands for the growth in outward FDI flows from Sweden in the iron and steel 
industry after 2005 in billion SEK in contrast to `Real estate activities´, which is deemed as a 
result of the policy. The coefficient for Steel at 43.543 reveals that the iron and steel sector had 
higher FDI flows than in the control group. It is evident when regarding the Post coefficient that, 
for both sectors, Swedish FDI outflows are trending upwards from 2005 onwards. 
 
 
For regression (2), when fixed effect for years are included, the Steel x Post is significant at the 5 
percent level. The standard errors have decreased from 14.822 to 7.615, and explanatory 
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power (R
2
) has increased by about 32 percentage points. This again strengthens the controlling 
for fixed effects as we through this discover that a lot of explanation of the model is due to 
yearly variations. We also observe an unchanged, more precise estimation of the Steel 
coefficient. 
 
 
We observe more significant and more precisely estimated coefficients, which indicates that 
investment leakage in the iron and steel sector has taken place in ROW due to the EU ETS. 
 
 
7.2.2 Professional, scientific and technical activities  
As we can see in the first regression when comparing the iron and steel sector with ‘Professional, 
scientific and technical activities’, the coefficient of interest is insignificant. The Steel and Post 
coefficients are however showing significant values at the 1 percent level, and explanatory power 
is high. We conclude that Swedish annual FDI outflow was 40.571 billion SEK higher in the iron 
and steel sector in relation to the control one, and an upgoing trend is present from 2005 
onwards. 
 
 
From regression (2), an indication of investment leakage is spotted. The coefficient of interest, 
showing a value of 20.854, is significant at the 10 percent level and Steel coefficient remains 
unchanged and significant. Controlling for fixed effects yet again increases the explanatory 
power and provides more precise estimates. Thereby the same conclusion as with ‘Real estate 
activities’ is drawn here, which further strengthens the conclusion of investment leakage to North 
America being present. 
 
 
7.3 Results for EU28+EFTA  
In this case, we expect an inverse result in comparison with the other two. This is because we 
now use data on Swedish FDI outflows inside the regulated area of the EU ETS (Sweden 
excluded). After 2005, average annual FDI in treatment group is expected to be lower than in the 
control one. Econometrically speaking, this implies that our coefficient of interest, Steel x Post, 
should be negative. One important aspect is that the key assumption for this region cannot be 
stated (see Figure 3) and hence the causal interpretation diminishes. Despite this, we include 
these regressions as it provides information about the development of FDI flows within 
EU28+EFTA. 
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As expected, Steel x Post is negative regardless of which is the control group. This coefficient 
for ‘Professional, scientific and technical activities’ is however far from significant, contrasting 
with the one for ‘Information and communication’ with high significance in both regressions. 
One striking observation in ‘Information and communication’ is that the Steel coefficient shows 
that the average FDI for the two sectors is not statistically different from zero in the pre-period, 
whereas the interaction variable show a large statistically significant difference in the two 
sectors. 
 
 
As mentioned above, a conclusive conclusion about the impact of the EU ETS on FDI outflows 
in the iron in steel sector is not possible for this region. If parallel trends assumption would hold, 
the conclusion would vary depending on which is the control group. This indicates that any 
conclusion about investment leakage should be drawn with caution, as the results are contrasting 
each other and thereby we leave this open for future investigations. 
 
 
8. Discussion  
The majority of our findings points to investment leakage in each region. This contradicts most 
of what has been determined by earlier literature, where the prevailing conclusion is that 
environmental regulations have a small to negligible impact on relocations (Oikonomou et al., 
2006). However, as investment leakage due to the EU ETS in particular is a relatively 
undiscovered area it would be irrational to directly connect earlier research with this paper. 
 
 
One can however elaborate on aspects that somehow could enrichen the analysis. Future research 
could investigate investment leakage in other emission-intensive sectors than the iron and steel 
secor. This would strengthen (or question) the conclusions drawn from this analysis. Inclusion of 
more variables to the analysis is also to consider for future research, not least concerning the cost 
aspect. As stated by Ederington et al. (2005), emission-intensive industries such as the iron and 
steel sector face large relocation costs which should be taken into consideration when examining 
investment leakage. A deeper analysis of the impact of other parameters such as for example 
trade barriers and political as well as economic risk on relocation to developing countries could 
also add significant value in this question (Oikonomou et al., 2006). 
 
 
Approaching the Porter Hypothesis, the Swedish steel market has lately shown commitment in 
environmentally friendly technology by investing in green steel (Löfvenberg, 2018, 
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February 5th). This is when steel is produced with less GHG emissions as the use of coal is 
extracted from the production process. Three Swedish firms (LKAB, SSAB and Vattenfall) has 
committed to the so called HYBRIT project, which is a production facility with the goal of 
making green steel. The project strives to emit no GHG emissions in the steel production. Should 
the pursuance become successful, the project may reduce CO2-emissions on a Swedish national 
level by 10 percent (TT, 2018, January 21th). It might also in the long run prove to be a 
profitable strategic investment decision for the firms, especially since the restrictions from the 
EU ETS has become stricter for each phase and that this trend seems to continue. Besides this, 
SSAB (2018, February 1st) argues that the HYBRIT project may be the crucial tool that is 
needed for Sweden to fulfill its commitments according to the Paris Agreement. The existence of 
this project may strengthen the claims made by Porter and van der Linde in the context of the EU 
ETS. However, by our research we cannot spot any impacts of stricter environmental goal 
resulting in innovation effects nor enhanced competitiveness level between firms. Besides, 
according to the analysis conducted here, the dominating theory seems to be the Pollution Haven 
Effect. 
 
 
With further regards to the clean innovation aspect, Vestre (2018) mentions that SSAB offer the 
most environmentally friendly steel on a global level. Their steel emits 26 percent less than its 
Chinese counterparts. We will avoid discussing the market implications that this might have for 
investment leakage as it lies outside the context of this paper. But, once again, that might point at 
an innovation effect within the Swedish borders. This could be due to the stricter environmental 
regulation in form of the EU ETS, which Porter and van der Linde argues for. As the innovation 
effects or any connections to the Porter Hypothesis is at the present unclear, future research 
could further explore this. 
 
 
To summarize, future research should keep examining the connection between investment 
leakage and Pollution Haven Effect with regards to the EU ETS. Except that, an interesting 
approach would be the potential innovation effects resulting from the climate policy. In such 
case we suggest a qualitative study focusing on questions around contributing factors to 
innovation investments. We look forward to see how this research area will develop throughout 
the years. 
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9. Conclusions  
Our findings through the DID analysis indicates a significant investment leakage within the iron 
and steel sector to North America and ROW. We also find suggestive evidence of negative 
spillovers in the steel sector in the case of EU28+EFTA, although the parallel trends assumption 
does not hold in this case. As shown in Figure 3, and strengthened by the regression, we observe 
a larger difference in average annual FDI flows in the post period for this region (outward FDI 
within the iron and steel sector is significantly lower in the post period compared to ‘Information 
and Communication’). However, due to the violation of the key identification assumption, we 
cannot attribute all of this to the EU ETS. 
 
 
In those cases when significant investment leakage was found, data at country-specific level 
would be preferable. Especially in the case of ROW, as we have experienced hardships when 
identifying the potential pollution havens arising from the policy. This means that we cannot 
distinguish if the FDI has gone mainly to developing countries as for example Pakistan or to a 
more developed country such as Taiwan. 
 
 
However, we consider that these conclusions about a significant investment leakage should be 
drawn with caution. One reason for this is that the results are not corresponding to the majority 
of earlier empirical studies on carbon leakage and pollution haven literature. This inevitably 
raises the question of the validity in our model. Referring to our main internal validity threat, the 
reasons could be many. For example, price dumping of steel prices in China and Russia 
happening simultaneously as the EU is recovering from the financial crisis in 2008 can be 
considered as one of these concerns. This may not have affected the highly niched Swedish steel, 
but could be a contributing factor to why FDI outflows in the iron and steel industry are not 
trending in the same way as our chosen control group. It could also indicate that the relative 
prices of producing steel outside the EU is decreasing and hence is attracting investments in 
ROW and North America. One can speculate if these actions have affected the Swedish 
investment decisions, but due to the lack of data and the limited time frame we leave this as an 
open question for future research. 
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Appendix  
For all tables from 2 to 4, the abbreviation of ‘Steel’ includes data from the iron 
and steel sector. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of FDI flows for North America 
 Type of   
Obs. 
  
Mean 
  
Std. Dev 
  
Min 
   
Max 
 
 
FDI 
            
                  
 Steel 19  27.390  20.626  6.2  73.4  
            
 Prof. 19  6.663  4.917  0.2  14  
                  
 Steel + 
38 
 
17.026 
 
18.139 
 
0.2 
 
73.4 
 
 
Prof. 
     
                 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics of FDI flows for Rest of the World 
 Type of FDI Obs. Mean Std. Dev  Min  Max  
              
 Steel 19  99.068  47.879  34.8   211.4   
              
 Real est. 19  37.890  29.292  9.7   98.8   
              
 Prof. 19  45.326  27.980  9.3   91.5   
              
 Steel + Real 
38 
 
68.479 
 
49.937 
 
9.7 
  
211.4 
  
 
est. 
       
             
 Steel + Prof. 38  72.197  47.304  9.3   211.4   
              
 Table 4. Summary Statistics of FDI flows for EU28+EFTA    
 Type of FDI Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev  Min   Max   
              
 Steel 19  49.426  20.306  19.9   89.1   
              
 Info. + 
19 
 
117.016 
 
68.119 
 
15.9 
  
213 
  
 
Com. 
       
             
 Prof. 19  30.168  18.494  4.8   59.2   
              
 Steel + Inf. 38  83.221  60.257  15.9   213   
              
 Steel + Inf. 38  39.797  21.499  4.8   89.1   
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Table 5. Data for North America – measured in billion SEK 
 
Year 
  
Steel & Iron 
  Prof., Sc. &  
     
Tech. 
 
        
1998  6.2  0.2  
      
1999  6.9  1.6  
      
2000  8.9  0.9  
      
2001  13.1  2.6  
      
2002  11.8  1.7  
      
2003  9.2  1.9  
      
2004  8.8  1.5  
      
2005  12.7  5.2  
      
2006  14.3  5.9  
      
2007  60.2  8.9  
      
2008  28.3  3.7  
      
2009  20.5  9.3  
      
2010  32.6  13.0  
      
2011  37.6  11.7  
      
2012  39.7  9.7  
      
2013  30.6  8.1  
      
2014  45.4  14.0  
      
2015  60.2  13.9  
      
2016  73.4  12.8  
          
Note that for year 2014 interpolation is used for ‘Steel’, which then is the value 
of 45.4. 
 
Table 6. Data for Rest of the World – measured in billion SEK 
 
Year 
  
Steel & Iron 
  
Real est. 
  Prof., Sc. &  
       Tech.             
1998  34.8  10.6  9.3  
        
1999  50.5  10.1  9.6  
        
2000  54.1  9.7  18.2  
        
2001  61.5  12.4  17.3  
        
2002  60.4  14.1  18.4  
        
2003  64.9  11.7  13.1  
        
2004  57.3  10.1  13.6  
        
2005  56.8  16.5  45.1  
        
2006  64.6  11.5  44.9  
        
2007  116.7  50.5  81.6  
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Year 
  
Steel & Iron 
  
Real est. 
  Prof., Sc. &  
       
Tech. 
 
           
2008  134.6  51.4  36.5  
        
2009  126.1  51.1  55.0  
        
2010  122.5  49.1  59.2  
        
2011  120.3  39.7  72.3  
        
2012  119.4  41.4  52.4  
        
2013  107.2  65.2  67.8  
        
2014  148.9  98.8  81.9  
        
2015  170.3  75.2  91.5  
        
2016  211.4  90.8  73.5  
            
 
Table 7. Data for EU28+EFTA – measured in billion SEK 
 
Year 
  
Steel & Iron 
  Info. &   Prof., Sc. &  
     
Com. 
  
Tech. 
 
          
1998  19.9  15.9  6.7  
        
1999  28.0  19.7  4.8  
        
2000  32.6  36.0  13.1  
        
2001  28.1  29.7  11.6  
        
2002  28.7  31.7  15.2  
        
2003  37.5  59.5  10.4  
        
2004  46.0  87.1  9.4  
        
2005  31.1  118.8  28.2  
        
2006  45.9  91.5  28.0  
        
2007  45.2  157.4  59.2  
        
2008  78.3  178.8  25.4  
        
2009  75.3  156.8  36.4  
        
2010  60.2  134.0  35.8  
        
2011  49.2  159.6  49.3  
        
2012  44.7  157.5  31.1  
        
2013  52.8  182.7  48.7  
        
2014  77.8  181.4  56.2  
        
2015  68.7  213.0  53.7  
        
2016  89.1  212.2  50.0  
             
All data is retrieved from Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB) through personal 
communication (e-mail) via Rickard Rens. 
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